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VOLUME 27 1990-1991 NUMBER 1
INTRODUCTION
CARL HILLLARD"
Are we headed towards a global village or a world divided into regional
confederations? The telecommunications network critical to the global village
is becoming increasingly fragmented and incompatible. Fundamental differences
in telecommunications policies exist between nations. These differences are
linked to the history and culture of each nation. United States telecommunica-
tion laws were principally written at a time when our economy was more insular
and independent. Must we reform these laws to effectively compete in today's
global environment, or is the law flexible enough to accommodate change? This
issue of the Califomia Western Law Review is part of an ongoing program at
California Western School of Law to focus attention on some of the many legal
issues arising out of the rapid development of new telecommunications
technology.
Structuring Foreign Investments in FCC Licensees Under Section 310(b) of the
Communications Act by Ronald W. Gavillet, Jill M. Foehrkolb, and Simone Wu
presents a comprehensive study of the case law interpretations of the prohibition
against alien control of U.S. radio licenses. Section 310(b) was enacted in 1934
at a time when control of radio facilities was considered a matter of national
security. Times have changed but our laws have not. The authors point out that
the grobalization of communications and growth of technology are forces which
push towards international ownership and financing of communications
companies. While foreign investment barriers have been removed (or have never
been erected) for technologies such as cable and fiber, they remain in the case
of radio licenses as limits on international ownership of communications
companies.
The authors explore and explain the alternatives available to satisfy some of
the objectives of foreign investors without raising the specter of de jure or de
facto control prohibited by section 310(b).
* Associate Professor of Law, California Western School of Law.
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Innovative Telecommunications Services and the Benefit of the Doubt by Warren
G. Lavey discusses the regulatory obstacles to telephone company-provided
Information Age services. Drawing from the examples of three different state
public utility commission cases, the author illustrates the dampening effect on
the introduction of new innovative services by regulatory policies which do not
adequately address the rapid development of technology.
The alternative proposed in this article is to treat innovative services as non-
common carrier offerings in the short run. When (and if) the new service
matures into a regular offering, it would become part of the regulated service of
the carrier. The author would establish a streamlined tariff review, a new com-
plaint process, and monitoring reports as safeguards against carrier abuse.
An Answer to Professor Pierce: How Utility Regulation Can Be Reformed in
Harmony with Constitutional Principles by Richard McKenna and Ward W.
Wueste, Jr., discusses the appropriate role of the judiciary in reviewing
regulatory decisions. The article is a challenge to the thesis put forward by
Professor Pierce that regulation will be replaced by competition because of the
failure of the courts to fulfill their role in restraining regulatory abuse.
Regulation is a substitute for competition and justified only when a monopoly
enterprise is vested with the public interest (enterprises we call "public utilities").
Since the inception of public utility regulation in this country, utility rates were
based on return on investment, and such investment was approved or prescribed
by utility commissions. The commissions were restrained from setting rates
which were unfair to utilities because to do so violates the Constitutional
prohibitions against the taking of property without just compensation. As the
authors point out, the regulators were also constrained by the capital markets
which would not invest in, or loan money to, utilities who could not earn a
profit.
The difficulty with rate of return regulation was that it gave public utilities the
incentive to invest and operate inefficiently. The electric utilities, discussed by
Professor Pierce, built huge inefficient plants because their return was based on
a cost plus contract with the public. The public utilities commissions reacted by
fixing long depreciation periods for plant investment in order to keep rates to
the public low.
This regulatory model began to erode when technology fostered competition
in the marketplace. In the case of electric utilities, co-generation plants
demonstrated a rate distortion of many magnitudes. The same is true in the
telephone industry. There the combination of obsolete telephone plant and
regulatory rate shifting resulted in wholesale defection of traffic from the public
networks by large business to private and alternative networks.
The initial utility/regulatory response to change was to maintain the status
quo-an effort doomed by technology and the courts. According to Professor
Pierce, the public utility commissions then reacted by unreasonably limiting new
investment and unfairly shifting the burden of costs to the utility investors.
Professor Pierce states that the electric utilities have been able to use the
intricacies of the regulatory process to thwart some of this regulatory unfairness.
[Vol. 27
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However, the utilities have now reached the conclusion that they would be better
off in a competitive environment than an increasingly hostile regulatory one.
The authors point out "that public utility regulation is designed to function in
a reasonably predictable world of modest incremental changes and relatively low
risk."' That world no longer exists. The struggle to find a new regulatory model
during this period of dynamic change is a daunting task-one in which Professor
Pierce sees the courts deferring to political institutions. Competition, in the
view of Professor Pierce, is coming about because of the failure of the courts to
prevent regulation gone amuck. The authors see a kinder, gentler regulator, still
constrained by the courts and capital markets, but engaged in an orderly
transition to competition.
Privately-Owned Commercial Telecommunications Satellites by Professor Pamela
L. Meredith and Franceska 0. Schroeder is a survey of the U.S. regulatory
approach to the licensing of private satellite systems. Although all of the current
private satellite systems are in a stationary position over the globe, several new
low-flying polar orbit satellite systems are on the drawing boards. One of these,
Motorola's $2 billion Iridium network, seeks to provide portable telephone
service on a global basis using seventy-seven small satellites2
The authors point out that international treaty law leaves the details of
satellite licensing to nations. The U.S. has developed a unique regulatory
scheme to promote competition in satellite service. This has resulted in a variety
of new satellite services which are responsive to marketplace demands.
Are U.S. regulatory policies well suited to competition on a global basis?
"[O]ur ability to maintain our accustomed standards of living in an increasingly
competitive world will probably depend heavily on our success in exploiting the
opportunities created by the exploding telecommunications and computing
technologies. .. . "3 Some commentators believe regulatory obstacles will
prevent U.S. companies from effectively competing with foreign companies. A
recent newspaper advertising campaign by Bell Operating Companies stated, "If
You Like Being No. 2, You'll Love America's Telecommunications Policy."
4
Who is number one and why?
Telephone Systems in the United States and Japan by Steven M. Spaeth discusses
the cultural and philosophical differences with regard to telecommunications
regulation in the U.S. and Japan. Japan has used two main vehicles to guide the
1. McKenna & WuesteAn Answer to ProfessorPierce: How Utility Regulation Can Be Reformed
in Harmony with Constitutional Principles, 27 CAL. W.L REv. 81, 96 n.85 (1990).
2. Malgieri, StrategicPlansMaySignalAT&TChalengetoIridiun, Radio Communication Report,
Sept. 24, 1990, at 1, col. 2.
3. Kahn, Telecommunications, Competitiveness and Economic Development-What Makes Us
CompeitiveZ PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 13, 1990, at 12.
4. Bettelheim, Baby Bells' Callsfor DecontrolRingLoudly, Denver Post, May 6,1990, at G1, col.
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development of its telecommunications infrastructure: a governmental agency
called the Ministry of International Trade Industry ("MITP) and the Nippon
Telephone and Telegraph ("NTP). The author notes that Japan historically has
taken a consensus approach to industry and business as opposed to the
competitive regime adopted by the U.S. This enables Japan to regulate with a
view towards its national interests while the U.S. regulates to ensure free pursuit
of individual economic interests. These two divergent approaches to regulation
stem from fundamental differences in culture. The open question is: Which
approach will generate the best result in our changing environment?
Law of Telecommunications and Broadcasting in India by KlD. Gaur is a
thorough discussion of the development of communications systems in India. All
communications facilities in India are government-owned or controlled. There
are extensive legislative prohibitions concerning the ownership of components
and materials used, or useful, in constructing communications systems with stiff
penalties for violators. Government agencies are vested with near dictatorial
power and control over India's communications facilities. This has resulted in
arbitrary and discriminatory conduct. In the author's view, the exercise of these
powers is inconsistent with the Indian Constitution and the spirit of other aws
governing their society.
The author notes two impediments to change. First, the government receives
substantial revenues from its regulatory activities. Second, the courts have
turned away past challenges to the government's regulatory authority. The
author argues that, as a practical matter, legislative reforms can only be accom-
plished with respect to the new communications technologies. He suggests that
a broadening of statutory definitions in regulatory acts covering traditional
communications services is the best approach.
European Regulation of Transborder Television by CA Giffard traces the
development of broadcast regulations and policies for the 1992 European
common market. These regulations contain restrictions on content, advertising,
and program origination. The author advances the arguments that the barriers
to distribution of U.S. entertainment services in Europe are justified on cultural
and economic grounds. No harm is seen to the U.S. entertainment industry
because the rapid proliferation of channels of entertainment in Europe will lead
to greater opportunity for distribution of mass media. This argument ignores the
fact that increased channels of distribution erode the "mass" in media.5 Howev-
er, the central point remains: the resistance to change which threatens
traditional values and economic self-interest mitigates against opening borders
and removing restrictions.
Prospects for the International Treaty on Telecommunications by Y.M. Kolossov
argues that new telecommunications technologies are increasingly global in
5. See Levine, The Last Gasp of Mass Media?, FORBES, Sept. 17, 1990, at 176.
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nature and impact. The state regulatory approaches are outmoded and the sole
international regulatory body ("ITU") has a charter which limits its effectiveness.
The author notes the development of regional treaties which replace state
regulation and suggests that these treaties be used as an international model.
In his view, failure to obtain international accord governing global telecommuni-
cations is not a viable alternative.
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